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Conclusion
What light does the Columbia Steel case shed on the future course of anti-
trust litigation? Does the victory of the United States Steel Corporation, as
the dissent averred, give carte blanche to corporate concentration?
No categorical answer seems possible. The peculiar facts of the case, with
their strong tinge of estoppel, remove the mere statement of result from the
realm of predictive usefulness. Instead, the case's significance rests on a
seriatim consideration of its impact on the various components of antitrust
doctrine.
Its main value to the antitrust defendant lies in the authoritative rejec-
tion of the theory that vertical integration is illegal per so. Of subsidiary aid
in cases where the facts permit its use may be the reminder, that specific
intent is an element which the plaintiff must prove.
As an aid to the successful prosecution of antitrust cases, Columbia, Steel
has much more to say: it strengthens market control as a test for determin-
ing illegality. It is true that the test cuts the other way in this case, because
of its inutility in appraising the prospective significance of mergers. But
for cases of full-blown monopoly, the Court's remarks on market control
take their place as a significant addition to the doctrine of Alcoa, Tobacco,
and Paramount. And with the economic test, the Court reaffirms the prac-
tice of setting a narrow limit to the relevant market.
But the new facet that may make the case a milestone in the development
of antitrust doctrine is the as yet enigmatic reference to Section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act. Even without legislative revision the section may now become an
effective sanction. Together with the Court's refusal to apply old merger
precedents, the canalizing of Section 7's policy into Sherman Act cases points
the way to a lower, more easily provable standard of illegality for mergers.
LIMITING THE DEEP ROCK DOCTRINE*
THE inconsistent role of a parent corporation as the creditor of its own
subsidiary has long confounded the courts.' Until 1939, the courts some-
times permitted the parent to participate as a creditor in the reorganiza-
tion of its subsidiary, despite parental mismanagement, when the obstacle
of their separate corporate entities appeared insurmountable.2 But in Taylor
*Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 211 (194S).
1. See LATTY, SussILUUMs AfD AFFULxxrnn CoMRoTro:is, 142-55 (1935); Rem-
bar, Claimws Against Affiliated Companices in RcorganLzatio;, 39 CoL L. Rmx. 907 (1939);
Comment, 45 YLE L. J. 1471 (1936).
2. Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 96 F2d 693 (10th Cir. 193S), re,'d, 396
U.S. 307 (1939), amended, 305 U.S. 618 (1939). Under the "instrumentality" rule the
court had to find the subsidiary a mere "instrumentality" or department of the parent
corporation in order to dispose of the parent's claim. Despite parental mismanagement the
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v. Standard Gas & Electric Co.,3 the Supreme Court enunciated the Deep
Rock doctrine, which put aside the conceptualistic puzzle of the corporate
entity and centered on the vital factor-whether the parent had breached
its fiduciary duty to others interested in the subsidiary.4 Thus, when the
parent had managed the subsidiary for its own benefit and to the detriment
of the subsidiary, and when the parent's claim was connected with that mis-
management, a bankruptcy court could disallow the claim, or at least
subordinate it to the claims of the subsidiary's other creditors and public
investors.5
Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors,' while strongly restating that
doctrine,7 may in fact represent its first significant limitation. In a joint
circuit court had felt unable to label the subsidiary an "instrumentality" of the parent
and the parent's claim was allowed. However even under this rule the dissenting judge
below was able to call the subsidiary an "instrumentality" and thereby dispose of the
parent's claim.
On the lack of predictability afforded by this approach see Douglas and Shanks, In-
sulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L. J. 193 (1929).
LAry, op. cit. supra note 1, at 143, 157 et seq., suggested that no realistic line of cleavage
could be drawn on the basis of the degree of control over the subsidiary and that in ac-
tuality judicial response was determined by unexpressed policy considerations.
3. 306 U.S. 307 (1939), amended, 306 U.S. 618 (1939). The Deep Rock Oil Corp.,
the subsidiary there involved, has furnished a name for the doctrine introduced by this case.
4. The character and scope of the parent's fiduciary obligation is defined, as in other
situations, by the extent of its power to affect the interests of third persons. McCandless
v. Furlaud, 296 U.S. 140 (1935). Thus while an express trustee cannot purchase an in-
terest in the subject matter of his trust, (Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 502, 557 (U.S.
1846) ), a parent or controlling stockholder, who is also a fiduciary, (Southern Pacific
Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 492 (1919)), is prohibited from purchasing stock from a mi-
nority stockholder only if such purchase involves overreaching, as in the utilization of inside
information. For an attempt to reconcile these divergent standards, see Overfield v. Penn-
road Corp., 42 F. Supp. 586, 607 (E.D. Pa. 1941), modified, 146 F.2d 889 (3rd Cir. 1944).
The class protected comprises the "entire community of interests in the corporation
-creditors as well as stockholders." Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939). On the
difficulties involved in applying the Deep Rock doctrine for the protection of the subsidl-
ary's public common stockholders, see, Israels, Implications and Limitations of the "'Deep
Rock" Doctrine, 42 CoL L. REv. 376, 386 (1942).
5. See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939), amended, 306
U.S. 618 (1939). "Though disallowance of such claims will be ordered where they are
fictitious or a sham, these cases do not turn on the existence or non-existence of the debt.
Rather they involve simply the question of order of payment." Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S.
295, 310 (1939). Thus Deep Rock sets up a system of equitable priorities in bankruptcy
to supplement the system of absolute priorities. See, Healy, Commissioner, concurring in
Middle West Corp., 11 S.E.C. 533, 566-7 (1942). See Comment, 49 YALE L.J. 881
(1940); Note, 50 YALE L.J. 892 (1941).
On the Deep Rock doctrine, see, Israels, Implications and Limitations of the "Deep
Rock" Doctrine, 42 COL. L. Raw. 376 (1942) ; Sprecher, The Conflict of Equities Under
the "Deep Rock" Doctrine, 43 CoL. L. REv. 336 (1943) ; Krotinger, The "Deep Rock"
Doctrine: A Realistic Approach to Parent-Subsidiary Law, 42 COL. L. REv. 1124 (1942)
Note, 47 COL. L. Rxv. 800 (1947).
6. 335 U.S. 211 (1948).
7. Id. at 228.
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reorganization of the Missouri Pacific Railroad (MOP) and its subsidiary
the New Orleans, Texas & New Mexico Railway (NOTM), 8 under section 77
of the Bankruptcy Act,9 the Supreme Court refused, despite charges o
mismanagement, to disallow or to subordinate any part of MOP's creditor
claim against NOTM.
Part of that claim derived from direct loans to NOTM during the years
1928 to 1931.10 Concurrently with the receipt of these loans, NOTM de-
clared and paid dividends in approximately the same amount, the major
portion of which returned to its parent MOP." These dividends exceeded
NOTM's current earnings, 12 although presumably they did not exceed its
surplus on a consolidated basis. But because the surplus derived almost en-
tirely from one of its own subsidiaries, the St. Louis, Brownsville & New
Mexico Railway, the dividends to MOP could be legally declared and paid
only after the Brownsville had declared large dividends to NOTM. 1" In
1931, this process reached its pre-bankruptcy climax when, with falling
revenues and scant working capital, the Brownsville declared dividends
totaling eight times its capital stock; 14 it could not, however, make a cash
8. At times relevant here MOP owned from 58 to 931 of NOTM capital stac. The
affairs of NOTMN were managed through MOP officers who were given corresponding
positions in NOTM.
9. 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), as amended, 49 STAT. 911(1935) and 53 STAr. 1405 (1939),
11 U.S.C. § 205 (1946).
10. MOP's total claim was over $10.5 millions but this Note considers only the sum
($2.8 millions) loaned by MOP concurrently with the payment of dividends by NOTM.
See note 11 inlra.
A description of two other parts of MOP's claim may be found in the dissent, Coin-
stock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 211, 248-51 (194S). The first of these
parts arose from MOP's attempt to improve its creditor standing at the expense of NOTM
by an intercorporate adjustment which, in effect, forced NOTM to assume the debt which
an NOTM61 subsidiary, weaker financially than NOTM, owed to MOP. The second part
concerned advances by MOP to NOTM to acquire five Texas railroad lines. Comstock
argued that these lines, which were operated at a loss, had been purchased for the benefit
of MOP rather than NOTM.
A majority of the Supreme Court refused to subordinate any of MOP's claim, but
the dissenters urged the subordination of the portions connected with the dividends and
with the assumption by NOTM of its subsidiary's debt, while refusing to subordinate the
portion connected with the purchase of the Texas railroads.
11. See table of concurrent loans and dividends, 335 U.S. 240 (1948). MOP's con-
tention was that the loans were actually for previous capital expenditures. This would
provide the legal basis for the borrowing. Actually the legality of the loans is not in
doubt. For a strong contention that the immediate purpose of the loans was to obtain
funds with which to pay dividends, see, Smz. REP. No. 25, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., pt. 9,
App. pp. 19, 20 (1940).
12. See tables of income for NOTM reproduced in the dissent, Comstock v. Group
of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 211, 243-4 (1948) ; see, also, SsI. REr. No. 25, op. cit.
supra note 11, at 2.
13. For the mechanics of this operation, see, SEN. RE-P. No. 25, op. cit. suPra note 11,
at 3, 4, 9, 10, 11.
14. The Brownsville had an unusual capital structure in that its debt vms 30 times
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payment on these dividends without leaving unpaid its operating debts to
NOTM. Nevertheless, in violation of ICC accounting rules," the dividends
were treated as income by NOTM. In this manner NOTM legally 10 con-
verted a surplus into notes payable to MOP.
Comstock, as a'holder of MOP bonds secured by NOTM common stock,
objected to MOP's creditor claim in an effort to preserve his equity in the
NOTM stock.17 His contention was that in milking NOTM, MOP had
breached its fiduciary duty, 18 to the detriment of its subsidiary. 19
The Supreme Court, four justices dissenting, upheld the trial court's
finding that these were not only legal but also good faith transactions, 20 and
its stock issue. But the dividends are also startling from the standpoint of the railway's
earnings, since they were over ten times its earnings for the year 1931. Comstock v.
Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 211, 245 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
15. "Dividends declared shall not be credited prior to actual collection unless their
payment is reasonably assured by past experience, guaranty, anticipated provision, or
otherwise." 49 CODE FED. REas. § 10.513 (1938). In 1936 the ICC informed NOTM that
it had violated this rule in 1931. Comstock v. Group of Investors, 335 U.S. 211, 245-6
(1948) (dissenting opinion).
16. The NOTM dividends were legal under state law although in excess of current
earnings, since by virtue of the dividends declared by Brownsville they were not in excess
of NOTM's corporate earned surplus. The fact that they may have been paid by borrow-
ing from MOP would not make them illegal.
17. Since MOP was insolvent, Comstock was opposed by the Group of Institutional
Investors, holders of MOP bonds not secured by NOTM stock.
On the applicability of the Deep Rock doctrine when the parent is insolvent, see In re
Commonwealth Light & Power Co., 141 F2d 734 (7th Cir. 1944), appeal disnissed, 322
U.S. 766 (1944). The court held that bondholders of the parent as pledgees of the sub-
sidiary's stock could obtain the subordination of the insolvent parent's tainted claim; while
the parent's other creditors would have to take subject to the equities. The court distiln-
guished Prudence Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89 (1942), where the claim of the defaulting
guarantor of the mortgage, in this case an insolvent parent corporation, was allowed to
share in the proceeds of the mortgage on grounds that it had not inequitably acquired its
claim.
Cf. Note, 47 COL. L. REv. 800, 810-5 (1947) (recommending a commingling of the
assets of the parent and the subsidiary, where both are insolvent, in order to achieve
equality of distribution among the same classes of creditors of the two corporations). On
commingling, see Stone v. Eacho, 127 F. 2d 284 (4th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
635 (1942). And see Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941)
(creditors of subsidiary allowed to recover from the assets of the parent),
18. Comstock objected on the theory that the parent owes a fiduciary duty to the
pledgees of the subsidiary's stock not to impeach the value of the pledge, Its re Com-
monwealth Light & Power Co., 141 F. 2d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1944), appeal disissed, 322
U.S. 766 (1944).
19. Comstock objected to other transactions besides the dividend payments. See note
10 supra.
20. The district court had four grounds for overruling Comstock's objection: (1) all
the transactions were legitimate and in good faith; (2) NOTM benefitted under MOP's
expansion program and the advances were related to that program because the loans re-
funded previous capital expenditures; (3) the objection was barred by laches; (4) sub-
ordination would injure other innocent bondholders who were not secured by NOTM
stock. In re Missouri Pac. R.R., 64 F. Supp. 64, 77-8 (E.D. Mo. 1945). The court of
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assumed that the district court's finding of benefit to NOTM under MOP's
expansion program applied to the dividend transactions.2 ' The majority
therefore refused to subordinate MOP's claim under the Deep Rock doctrine.
Apparently the decisive finding of good faith depended on the statements of
the parent's officers and directors based on the consolidated balance sheet,
without specific inquiry into the origin of the NOTM surplus. The dissenting
justices argued that mere legality and good faith do not remove inequity
from intercorporate transactions and that the finding of over-all operative
benefits from MOP's expansion program did not apply to these particular
transactions. The loans, though doubtless funding prior legitimate capital
expenditures, were made, they thought, in order to permit the payment of
dividends at a time when dividends were unjustifiable as a matter of ordi-
nary prudence. The minority's view therefore wvas that the impropriety of
the dividends infected the status of the loans which financed them. They
therefore urged that the claim of MOP connected with the payment of the
questioned dividends be subordinated. 2 2
The Court, by refusing to examine the extent of the financial detriment
to the pledgees from particular transactions, has unduly limited its power
to investigate the mismanagement of subsidiaries. Earlier Deep Rock cases
provide a standard of fiduciary duty which, at least verbally, demands more
from the parent than good faith and over-all operational benefits to the
subsidiary. In Taylor v. Stauard Gas & Electric Co., 2 3 where the subsidiary
was undercapitalized and, in addition to other acts of mismanagement, was
compelled to borrow from the parent to pay unwarranted but legal divi-
appeals affirmed on the first and second grounds. Comstock v. Group of Institutional
Investors, 163 F.2d 350 (8th Cir. 1947).
In affirming, the Supreme Court stressed the point that exceptional error was required
to overturn the concurrent finding of two courts below. The Court rejected the defense
of laches because the subject matter of the objection went beyond the objector's individual
interests and affected the fairness and equity of the reorganization plan. Comstock v.
Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 211, 226-7 (1943). The majority did not con-
sider the fourth ground of the district court's holding. The dissent considered that the
insolvency of the parent did not bar the application of the Deep Roe: doctrine and that
the indirect loss to the innocent bondholders from subordination was outweighed by the
direct loss to the pledgees. Id. at 23S-9. See note 17 supra.
21. Mr. Justice Jackson, writing the majority opinion, dearly overstated his case.
"The criticized transactions ... are established as beneficial rather than injurious to the
interests which now challenge them." Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335
U.S. 211, 230 (1948). At most the district court had said that MOP control and the ad-
vances to NOTM were beneficial to the NOTMI and the holders and pledgees of its
securities. This certainly does not mean that the payment of dividends to MOP w.,as
beneficial to the pledgees of NOTM common stock.
22. There have been numerous cases subordinating the parent's claim when it was
connected with the payment of unwarranted dividends. See, e.g., Taylor v. Standard Gas
& Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939), amendcd, 306 U.S. 618 (1939) ; Ik re Common-
wealth Light & Power Co., 141 F2d 734 (7th Cir. 1944), appeal dismisscd, 3"- U.S. 765
(1944) ; Indiana Service Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release N o. 7054, December
14, 1946.
23. 306 U.S. 307 (1939), amended, 306 U.S. 61S (1939).
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dends,24 the Court indicated that the parent must provide the subsidiary
with the equivalent of an "independent management." Holding-company
transactions had to be made with an "eye single" to the interests of the
subsidiary. 25 In Pepper v. Liton,26 it was stated that the dominant stock-
holder had the burden of proving not only the good faith of his dealings
with the corporation but also their "inherent fairness" to all interested in
the corporation.2
Contrasted with this standard, the test of good faith and over-all opera-
tional benefits appears ineffectual. Good faith appears inadequate because
the intent of the parent's officers and directors is not only difficult of proof,8
but it cannot in any case disclose whether the assets of the subsidiary have
been inequitably withdrawn to the detriment of the cesluis.219 The test of
over-all operational benefits from previous capital expenditures is not di-
rectly relevant to a determination of the financial detriment to the pledgees
from the dividend payments. The dividends certainly do not make possible
the previous expenditures."
24. See Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COL. L. REv. 343, 350 (1947).
Berle considers the loans by the parent in the Taylor case as an "equity investment." Use
of the label may help verbally in the treatment of the loan as a stock equity with result-
ing subordination. Similarly, the courts have sometimes called loans capital investments,
where they were advanced to an inadequately capitalized corporation. Arnold v. Phillips,
117 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1941) (loans for building a brewery were subordinated but those
for current expenses were not).
25. Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307, 323 (1939), amended, 306
U.S. 618 (1939)..
26. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
27. Id. at 306. See, also, In re V. Loewer's Gambrinus Brewery Co., 167 F.2d 318 (2d
Cir. 1948).
The SEC has often faced Deep Rock situations, in passing on reorganizations under
section 11 of the Public Utilities Holding Company Act, 49 STAr. 820 (1935), 15 U.S.C.
§ 79k (1947). The Commission employs a similar standard. See, e.g., Indiana Service
Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 7054, Dec. 14, 1946, at 34-5 (subordinat-
ing where dividend payments are "obviously inconsistent with the best interests" of the
subsidiary) ; Southern Natural Gas Co., 9 S.E.C. 486, 497 (1941) ("profit shall not re-
sult to holding companies from transactions between a holding company and its subsidiary,
without justification therefor . . .").
28. See Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence and Indifference; the Relation of Mental
States to Negligence, 39 HARv. L. REv. 849, 865 (1926). Compare the SEC's specific re-
jection of "good faith" as a fiduciary standard, upheld in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194 (1947) (note especially Mr. Justice Jackson's vigorous dissent at 209) with the in-
stant case. See, also, In re Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 46 F. Supp. 77, 88-9 (S.D.
Cal. 1941) (good faith or innocent motives of the fiduciary constitute no defense to lia-
bilities founded upon breach of fiduciary obligations).
29. "Like negligence, inequity may be present where there is the utmost subjective
good faith." Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 211, 238 (1948) (dis.
senting opinion).
30. The existence of an expansion program for the subsidiary and the failure to
provide for the sound financing of the program has been used as a reason for subordhiat-
ing advances by the parent when connected with the payment of dividends. It re Com-
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Previous Deep Rock cases, however, containing more evidence of mis-
management than the Comstock case, presented the Court with a more
clean-cut basis for subordination.3i While the Taylor case involved the
inadequate capitalization of the subsidiary in addition to undeserved di.i-
dends, as well as other acts of mismanagement, and the Pepper case arose
from the clearly fraudulent use of a one-man corporation, neither fraud nor
inadequate capitalization could here be shown. On the contrary, instead of
over-all mismanagement, one finds here operational benefits to NOTM.
The presence of this factor and the absence of inadequate capitalization 2.-
an element traditionally important in other aspects of parent-subsidiary
law 33-make the instant case a marginal Deep Rock case. Mismanagement,
if present, must derive from milking operations which are separable from
other aspects of MOP management.
But the factual difference between the Taylor case and the instant case
does not justify the Court's aquiescence in a weaker standard. 4 Either
undercapitalizing or milking the subsidiary seems to warrant subordination,
for both have the same result: the production of a creditor-proof corpora-
monwealth Light & Power Co., 141 F.2d 734, 738-9 (7th Cir. 1944), appeal dis miscd,
322 U.S. 766 (1944); Indiana Service Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No.
7054, December 14, 1946 at 32-4.
31. The Court has said that the basis of subordination in the Taylor case was "the
history of spoilation, mismanagement, and faithless stewardship of the affairs of the sub-
sidiary." Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 303 (1939). It should be noted that in the Taylor
case the entire claim of the parent was subordinated because the complexity of the case v,'as
such that the Court felt that it was impossible to restore the subsidiary to the position it
would have had but for the parent's mismanagement. Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric
Co., 306 U.S. 307, 323 (1939), amended, 306 U.S. 618 (1939). But cf. In re Midland United
Co., 58 F. Supp. 667 (D.Del. 1944), appeal dismissed, 141 F.2d 692 (3rd Cir. 1944) (faced
with an extremely complex fact situation the court approved a compromise, subordinating
a portion of the parent's claim). See Note, 47 COL. L. Rmv 8O0, S03-9 (1947) and cases
cited therein.
32. See Israels, Implications and Limitations of the "Deep Rod?" Doctrine, 42 Col. L.
Rev. 376, 379 (1942). Israels in a tentative analysis presents inadequate capitalization as
a prerequisite for the application of the Deep Rock doctrine. See, also, Note, 47 COL L.
REV. 800, 806 (1947) (".... in none of the cases (subordinating the parent's claim) was
it denied that capital was inadequate."). On inadequate capitalization, see, Rembar, Claims
Against Affiliated Companies in Reorganiration, 39 COL L. REv. 907, 915-6 (1939).
33. Douglas and Shanks, Imlation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations,
39 YALE L.J. 193, 218 (1929).
34. The distinction between the "good faith" and the "independent management" stand-
ards may well prove to be largely a verbal one. See DoDD, SrocK NVAEr.lNx; Tim Ju-
DICIAL VALUATION OF PROPERTY FOR STOCK IssuE PuarosEs 92-3 (1930). Dodd contends
that the distinction between the "good faith" and the "true value" rules for the valuation of
assets has become merely a verbal distinction because in both cases the question resolves
itself into whether the valuation was reasonable.
But there seems an equally good chance that the "good faith" test will become the
cloak for a "legal" test. See Mr. Justice Jackson's emphasis on the legality of the dividends,
Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 211, 228-9 (1943).
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tion. 5 Despite the absence of over-all mismanagement, the Court could
have asked whether an independent management could reasonably have
consented to the transactions."5 An independent management with bank-
ruptcy impending would hardly have undertaken the desperate financial
measures adopted by NOTM in order to continue the payment of dividends.
Such a view would have led to subordination of part of MOP's creditor
claim against NOTM 37
On the other hand, the Court would seem equally unjustified if, applying
the Deep Rock doctrine to separable acts of mismanagement, it were to
subordinate MOP's entire claim." The amount of the claim subordinated
might depend either directly upon the amount of dividends which would
not have been paid by an independent management, or upon the amount of
the loans found to be directly connected with those dividends. Although the
latter measure is clearly indicated by both majority 11 and dissenters 11 in
the Comstock case, a requirement that the claim subordinated be related to
the individual acts of mismanagement, under these circumstances, seems
an arbitrary one. The pledgees of NOTM stock suffered unjustifiable detri-
ment to the extent of the dividends found to be unwarranted, and not at
all to the extent of MOP's loans to NOTM, however closely these loans may
have coincided in time and amount with the dividends. Similarly, MOP
benefited to the extent of the dividends, not the loans. If tainted loans were
to be the measure, moreover, an artificial issue of fact would be interjected.
35. There are numerous methods by which a parent may drain the assets of a subsid-
iary. See, e.g., In re United Gas Corp., 58 F. Supp. 501 (D. Del. 1944) (payment of divi-
dends made possible by grossly inadequate reserve policy) ; In re Midland United Co., 58
F. Supp. 667 (D. Del. 1944), appeal dismissed, 141 F.2d 692 (3rd Cir. 1944) (securitiem,
owned by subsidiary used by parent as collateral for its borrowing from third party) ; Over-
field v. Pennroad Corp., 42 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1941), nodified, 146 F.2d 889 (3rd Cir.
1944) (subsidiary forced to make injurious investments for the benefit of the parent);
Middle West Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 6606, May 10, 1946 (huge
profit to parent corporation from sale of subsidiary's securities) ; Pennsylvania Electric
Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4643, Oct. 27, 1943 (parent advanced un-
needed and unused credits to subsidiary at a high rate of interest).
36. For a skillful application of this test, see Ewen v. Peoria & E. Ry., 78 F. Supp. 312
(S.D. N.Y. 1948).
37. See Mr. Justice Murphy, dissenting at 335 U.S. 211, 247; SEN. REP. No. 25, 76th
Cong., 3rd Sess., pt. 9 (1940) (vigorously condemning MOP for the dividend manipula-
tions).
Added support for this position is afforded by the SEC. With a dividend situation com-
parable to that in the Comstock case, the Commission has not hesitated to apply Deep Rock
where the dividends are not "in the best interests" of the subsidiary. Indiana Service Corp.,
SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 7054, December 14, 1946.
If the Court had decided to subordinate a portion of the parent's claim in the Consloelk
case, it might well have remanded the case for a determination of the date at which NOTM
dividends became unwarranted.
38. Cf. note 31 supra.
39. Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 211, 228 (1948).
40. Id. at 237.
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